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Judicial Activism at the World Trade




The remarkable success of the international trade regime has created
demands for an international environmental policy, minimum labor stan-
dards, and other social regulatory policies to be incorporated into the law or
jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").' Linkage of so-
cial regulatory policy with trade might occur by negotiating new WTO
agreements codifying political solutions to regulatory problems, 2 by utiliz-
ing the policy-making procedures of the General Council,3 or by judicial ac-
tivism at the Appellate Body ("AB"). 4 The AB is the WTO judicial organ
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1 Uruguay Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 3 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2 Linking other subject areas to trade by negotiating new agreements has proven difficult.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights does require the
recognition and enforcement of intellectual property rights by all WTO members. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 31
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. In other areas strong resistance from developing
countries and others has prevented positive regulation at the WTO. For an analysis of diffi-
culties in linking trade and rules for foreign investment, see Sol Picciotto, Linkages in Inter-
national Investment Regulation: The Antimonies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 731, 734 (1998).
3 For a discussion of the General Council's limited authority to interpret or amend the
WTO agreements, see infra section I.
4 Several commentators propose that the AB interpret existing WTO provisions to better
accommodate trade rules with environmental and social policy concerns. Some would re-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:353 (2002)
which is effectively the final legal authority on the interpretation of WTO
agreements.5 This article offers a modified contractual approach to linkage
issues and specifically opposes judicial activism as beyond the delegated
authority of the AB, and contrary both to democratic legitimacy and wise
policy development in a world of divergent values and interests.
Pressure for the inclusion of non-trade values into the trade regime
through judicial activism is, to some degree, the product of two intersecting
developments. The first is the success of the new WTO dispute settlement
system. The 1995 Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") mandates
compulsory dispute settlement as a condition of membership and provides
an opportunity for an international trading system under the rule of law,
rather than a power-based regime.6 Nations file complaints to panels whose
decisions may be appealed on legal grounds to a professional AB. These
decisions, while theoretically reversible by the Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB"), have been automatically adopted in all cases, and have the effect
of judicial decisions.7 Petitions for adjudication that previously may have
been blocked under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
dispute process now proceed to decision.8
The second development is the lack of political will among nations to
effectively address systemic international problems such as environmental
degradation, global warming, the loss of biodiversity, and persistent human
rights violations. 9 Member states of the WTO, for example, have not used
existing processes to harmonize environmental standards or to clarify
whether unilateral trade measures to enforce environmental standards are
quire that the Article XX(b) exception for human and animal health be interpreted to permit
a balancing of trade and environmental values. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Val-
ues, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 714-18 (1996). Robert Howse, for example, proposes that the
public morality exception in Article XX(a) be interpreted to justify trade sanctions against
products produced in a manner that denies workers' core labor rights. Robert Howse, The
World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 131 (1999).
5 The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that AB decisions are to be automati-
cally adopted unless there is a consensus against the decision. Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
6 Id. at art. 1.
7 See Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decis in WTO Adjudication, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (1999) (arguing that panel and AB decisions have become a de
facto system of precedent).
8 Under the prior GATT dispute system, members states could block the formation of a
panel and therefore block the adoption of a panel decision. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 199-200 (2d ed. 2001).
9 For a catalog of twenty unaddressed problems that represent a "governance gap" at the
global level, see Jean-Francois Rischard, High Noon: We Need New Approaches to Global
Problems, Fast, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507, 513-23 (2001).
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contrary to members' obligations under the agreements. In this policy vac-
uum, the WTO bears the burden of arbitrating controversial policy disputes.
Social regulatory policy disputes at the WTO have been portrayed by
activists and the media as struggles between advocates of free trade, such as
multinational corporations, and environmental or labor interest groups from
highly developed societies. Missing from this business/environmental di-
chotomy are the interests of the majority of the world's population. Many
developing countries perceive that the problems of world poverty, the lack
of access to the protected agricultural and textile markets in the United
States, Europe and Japan, and the inadequate access to pharmaceutical
drugs and health care, are of even greater importance than western percep-
tions of pressing social policy and should be paramount considerations in
trade policy. Developing countries are concerned that the incorporation of
environmental, labor, or human rights policy into the trade regime without
their consent, in a manner that justifies the imposition of unilateral trade
sanctions, would deny them access to markets and may undermine efforts to
alleviate poverty.'0
How should the competing values and interests in social policy dis-
putes be reconciled at the WTO? Should AB judges be permitted to incor-
porate other international norms or modernize agreements based on their
understanding of community norms? Or is the development of international
law better served by member nations, as representatives of their peoples,
determining the balance of protection and costs through the political proc-
ess of consensual agreements? These are questions of institutional compe-
tence: the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority among nations
and the various organs of the WTO. Much of the debate in the literature
and in the streets has been a substantive debate about the appropriate pol-
icy," I but perhaps even more important than transitory positions about sub-
10 Developing countries adamantly opposed trade linkage with both environmental and
labor issues in the recent Doha trade negotiations, but the European Union succeeded in
placing some environmental issues on the agenda. See WTO Members Nations Agree to
Launch Development Round at Tough Talks in Doha, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 1814,
1816-17 (Nov. 15, 2001). Southern environmental NGOs also appear to understand that uni-
lateral trade sanctions restrict imports from the South. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World
Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's
Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 72 (2001) [here-
inafter WTO Member Nations].
11 Critics of globalization and WTO trade liberalization policies argue that free trade re-
duces the ability of domestic regulators to maintain environmental and labor standards and
shifts production and capital to nations with lower standards and wages. For an analysis of
various critical approaches, see Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of
U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's Future,
24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 608, 619-23 (2000). Defenders of trade liberalization contend that
liberal trade policies lead to higher incomes and economic growth that fosters stricter
environmental standards and private standard setting. See, e.g., Alessandra Casella, Free
Trade and Evolving Standards, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR
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stantive issues are the structural issues of what institution should determine
the content of regulation and by what process. Should a nation be permitted
to require compliance with its labor and environmental laws by foreign pro-
ducers as a condition of entry, or is such regulation purely a subject of in-
ternational political negotiations? Procedural concerns about WTO
adjudication are being debated surrounding two interrelated issues: (1) the
incorporation issue - to what extent should customary and other interna-
tional norms be incorporated as rules of decision in WTO dispute settlement
decisions, 12 and (2) the creative interpretation issue-to what degree should
panels and the AB exercise broad discretion in making law in the process of
the necessary interpretation of WTO provisions.' 3 While both the incorpo-
ration and creative interpretation issues appear to raise questions about the
structure and content of WTO jurisprudence, at a deeper level they raise
fundamental questions about the structure and content of international law
itself.
In a number of recent decisions the AB has begun to grapple in a non-
systematic way with both the incorporation and creative interpretation is-
sues. 14 These decisions raise serious concerns that the AB is exceeding its
authority under the DSU and inappropriately incorporating non-WTO law
or interpreting WTO agreements in a manner that diminishes the rights of
members. This article explores both the incorporation and creative interpre-
tation questions by assessing the relative merits of three different models of
how social regulatory policy might be integrated into WTO decision-
making: the Judicial Activist Model, the Contract Model, and the Legisla-
tive Model.
The Judicial Activist Model posits a WTO legal system that empowers
and Evolving Standards, in I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE
TRADE? 119, 148-49 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter Bagwati
& Hudec, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION].
12 Joost Pauwelyn contends that WTO agreements are part of the public international law
system, and therefore international legal norms apply at the WTO unless nations specifically
contract out of a particular norm. This analytical model leads him to conclude that defen-
dants should be allowed to invoke international law as a justification for a breach of WTO
rules. Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We
Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001). Robert Howse and Makau Mutua argue that the WTO
must be integrated into international law and that many international norms are superior to
WTO treaty norms. See ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000).
13 Several commentators have suggested that the AB should interpret provisions in WTO
agreements to permit a state to unilaterally require other states to comply with its process
standards or be denied access to markets. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The
Product/Process Distinction, an Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade
Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 249 (2000); Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT
Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcoN. L .739, 849-855 (2001).
14 See discussion of the Shrimp/Sea Turtle and other cases infra Part IV.
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AB judges to incorporate non-WTO norms and to interpret the provisions of
the various WTO agreements in an expansive way. Under this model, AB
judges are able to respond to changes in the international social system in-
cluding new norms and new problems. Advocates of this approach encour-
age the AB to balance competing policy values in interpreting standards or
in filling gaps in WTO agreements.' 5 The Contract Model, on the other
hand, assumes that the WTO is a self-contained contractual regime of sov-
ereign states whereby nations accept limited obligations in exchange for re-
ciprocal commitments by other states.16 Policy decisions under this model
are appropriately made by nations themselves under the principle of con-
sent. The Legislative Model assumes that the WTO is empowered, or could
be empowered, to act as a legislature making binding decisions based on
majority rule or the rule of a super-majority. Under this model the General
Council could exercise its existing power to interpret WTO agreements or
be further empowered to make policy by clarifying broad standards in exist-
ing agreements through interpretations or by amending agreements where
necessary. Each model has, at least, some basis in WTO law or practice
and has been utilized to some degree in other international legal institu-
tions.' 7 Each model is a normative framework for how global governance
should proceed with different assumptions about the proper allocation of
authority between nations and international institutions.
All three models raise issues of the democratic legitimacy of WTO de-
cisions and the distribution of power among nations. A choice among these
models as to which is the preferred process for making law at the WTO af-
fects the relative power of nations in policy-making and, in many cases,
would determine the content of norms. If legal development at the WTO
followed the Contract Model, proposed amendments to GATT 1994 to
harmonize environmental standards would likely be unsuccessful without
corresponding concessions to nations with lower standards.' 8 The accep-
tance of the Judicial Activist Model, however, would authorize the AB to
15 See, e.g., DAN ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE
(1994) (suggesting a jurisprudence that balances effects and proposing a series of interpre-
tive and procedural reforms).
16 See P. J. Kuyper, The Law of the GATT as a Special Field of International Law: Igno-
rance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System of International Law?, 25 NETH. Y. BK.
INT'L L. 227 (1994).
17 See discussion infra Part II.
18 At the recently completed ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, EU proposals to place
trade and environmental issues on the negotiating agenda in the new trade round received
little support and were widely perceived as 'green protectionism.' See Trade Officials As-
sess Winners, Losers in Aftermath of Doha Ministerial Meeting, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
at 856, 1857 (Nov. 22, 2001). Similarly, developing countries successfully opposed any lan-
guage in the ministerial declaration linking the new trade agenda to labor issues. See WTO
Member Nations, supra note 10 at 1817.
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permit unilateral sanctions and thereby shift the relative power among na-
tions to develop global policy as well as the distribution of burdens and re-
wards.
This article takes a decidedly contractualist stance. Its overall premise
is that international social policy should develop through contractual treaty
regimes rather than by judicial activism. Customary and other norms of in-
ternational law ought not be generally incorporated into WTO jurisprudence
except where specifically authorized under WTO agreements or where the
AB finds, in its discretion, that international norms provide useful guidance
on procedural issues within its authority.
Judicial activism undermines basic values at the heart of the WTO
agreement including national sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. The
appropriate way to inject environmental and labor policy into the trade re-
gime is through specific, negotiated bargains based on the legitimizing
principle of consent. This article further argues that several of the recent
WTO decisions that appear to utilize either the incorporation or creative in-
terpretation approaches of the judicial activist model are better rationalized
by a more sophisticated contract. This article suggests that this model, re-
ferred to as the "Contractual Authority" Model, is a better approach for rec-
onciling democratic legitimacy, national sovereignty, and social policy
claims.
Section II discusses the three models of policy-making, analyzing the
extent to which each is reflected in the governance structure of the WTO,
and argues that the AB lacks either express or implied authority to engage
in substantive policy-making. Section III examines the wisdom of utilizing
judicial activism as a process for developing international social regulatory
policy at the WTO. Section IV discusses recent WTO decisions and ex-
plains the advantages of the "Contractual Authority" Model. Section V of-
fers several principles of judicial self-restraint to circumscribe the authority
of the AB and limit judicial activism.
IL. MODELS OF POLICY-MAKING AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE WTO
The Legislative Model, Judicial Activist Model, and the Contract
Model, comprise the primary alternative methods of governance in interna-
tional institutions.19 Each has a long history within domestic societies and
finds some expression within the WTO. The legislative model, as supple-
19 The Legislative Model, although rare in the international context, does occur. The
United Nations Security Council, for example, is composed of ten elected representative
states and five permanent members. Decisions require an affirmative vote of only nine
members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. U.N. CHARTER arts. 23,
27 3.
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mented by judicial activism in some societies, is the preferred method of
law creation in democratic societies and is premised on democratic legiti-
macy. Legal policy in the form of legislation is generally perceived as le-
gitimate in democratic societies if it is approved by a majority or super-
majority of the peoples' representatives in the legislature. 20 The legislators
are subject to periodic elections and thus accountable to the people.21
Unlike domestic legal systems, the WTO is a statist system with citi-
zens of the constituent states possessing no direct opportunity to vote on
decisions or to indirectly participate by selecting representatives who then
make legislative policy decisions. Individual nations are the only official
members and formal participants in this legal system. Nevertheless, the
democratic legitimacy of WTO decisions is preserved in democratic socie-
ties to the extent that a nation consents to a particular policy and officials
responsible for that policy are accountable to its people. In the United
States, for example, the democratic legitimacy of the policies and proce-
dures in WTO Agreements is preserved when new trade agreements are
subsequently passed into law by a majority vote of both houses of Congress
and signed by the President consistent with the procedures of the U.S. Con-
22stitution.
A legislative process for WTO decisionmaking by a majority of states
would be consistent with democratic legitimacy, at least in a formal sense,
if such a majoritarian process had prior approval by legislators accountable
to the people.23 The WTO Agreement does, in fact, authorize a carefully
20 Legal rules and policy developed by the legislature may be legitimate in two different
senses. First, such rules or policies may meet the requirements of formal or 'legal' legiti-
macy if they are enacted according to prior rules of law creation such as the procedures
mandated in a constitution or required by tradition. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law andIts
Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 195 (1977). Second, legal rules may be generally perceived as legiti-
mate because a given society, presumably democratic, accepts such norms as binding.
Weiler terms this a problem of social legitimacy. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transforma-
tion of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2466-73 (1991) (updated and expanded in JOSEPH H.H.
WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 80-86 (1999)).
2 Democratic elections help assure that governments continue to be responsive to the
governed. See P.H. PARTRIDGE, CONSENT AND CONSENSUS 29 (197 1).
22 This has been the current practice in the United States, but the Constitution does not
specifically provide for such a procedure, and its constitutionality is a matter of some debate.
Lawerence Tribe argues that because the Constitution mentions only the treaty process in
Article II as a means to create binding international agreements, it is the exclusive constitu-
tional process. Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). Peter Spiro
argues that constitutional practice and wise political judgment support the current practice.
Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV.
961 (2001).
23 There would be prior consent to an authoritative process of law creation. H.L.A. Hart
has termed such authoritative processes rules of recognition, that is, rules that define the cri-
teria necessary for the formation of primary rules of conduct. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT
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circumscribed legislative role for its primary organs with regard to certain
limited policy decisions. While consensus remains the preferred process of
decisionmaking, 24 the Ministerial Conference and its executive alter ego,
the General Council, 25 are authorized to adopt interpretations, waivers, and
amendments by super-majority votes.26
Binding interpretations of the WTO agreements, for example, require a
vote of three-fourths of the members.27 Interpretations could be utilized to
clarify broad provisions such as the meaning of 'necessity' in the WTO
Agreement Article XX(b) exception with regard to measures concerning
animal or human health or the application Article XX(g) exception for "ex-
haustible natural resources." In practice, neither the Ministerial Council nor
the Governing Council has exercised this arguably broad policy-making au-
thority to clarify agreements whether by interpretation or amendment.28
While the failure to utilize these legislative procedures may, in part, be
explained by the high three-fourths voting threshold, there may be a more
fundamental cause. The failure to engage in any significant attempt to util-
ize the super-majoritarian procedures for policy-making suggests that na-
tions perceive consent through new agreements to be more compatible with
the statist nature of the WTO system and with legitimate lawmaking proce-
dures. Nations, with a few limited exceptions, remain unwilling to accept
majority rule in international lawmaking. 29 This position reflects the con-
tinuing belief associated with national sovereignty that each nation should
alone decide whether to accept a new obligation that limits its freedom of
action.3°
The failure to embrace majoritarian processes is also a practical result
OF LAW 94-95 (2d ed. 1994). Others term this basis of legitimacy as general consent. See
Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for In-
ternational Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 618-19 (1999).
24 Under the WTO Agreement, consensus is defined as no member present at a meeting
formally objecting to the decision. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at art. IX. 1, n. 1.
25 The WTO Agreement creates the Ministerial Council as the primary governing body,
but it is only required to meet every other year. The General Council performs the functions
of the Ministerial Council when it is not in session. Both are comprised of a representative of
each member state. Id. at art. IV.
26 The Ministerial Council may waive an obligation imposed on Members by a three-
fourths vote of the Members. Id. art. IX.3. In general, amendments that would alter rights
and obligations are effective only for those nations accepting them upon a two-thirds vote of
Members. Id. art. X.3. Certain critical provisions in agreements do, however, only take ef-
fect upon acceptance by all members. Id. at art. X 2.
27 Id. at art. IX 2.
28 The amendment process is even further constrained because substantive amendments
are effective only for those members accepting the proposal. Id. at art. IX 3.
29 For a discussion of the few other examples, see Bodansky, supra note 23, at 607-11
(discussing the limited procedures for listed chemicals under the Montreal Protocol).
30 See BHALA, supra note 8, at 584. (viewing this reluctance as concern about the poten-
tial tyranny of the majority).
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of democratic accountability. Democratic governments may not relish the
prospect of subjecting citizens to policies that the electorate may perceive
as against their interests. Citizens of those states opposing a particular in-
terpretation would be bound to a policy affecting their interests even though
neither they nor their elected representatives approved it. Such decisions
using prior agreed majoritarian processes might possess formal legitimacy,
but nevertheless be perceived as undemocratic, and hence illegitimate by a
nation's electorate. 31 If WTO organs utilized majoritarian processes to cre-
ate new obligations, the democratic legitimacy of WTO decisions would be
even further attenuated and public support eroded. Instead, nations con-
tinue to utilize negotiated agreements as the primary legitimate mode of
legislating new policy. New agreements, when presented to legislatures,
permit a national voice in policy decisions that cannot be overridden by a
majority vote of other nations.
The Judicial Activist alternative for policy development posits a WTO
legal system that explicitly or implicitly empowers AB judges to interpret
the provisions of the various WTO agreements in an expansive way, re-
sponding to changes in the international social system. Advocates of this
approach envision a WTO legal system that is part of and, in some respects,
subordinate to a larger international system of norms and principles that
could inform AB decisions. There are various versions of this general the-
sis. Robert Howse and Makau Mutua perceive an international legal system
where treaty norms are subordinate to international customary norms and
32jus cogens norms. David Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis take the position
that the provisions of the DSU effectively incorporate the various sources of
international law into WTO law 33 and that other international treaties and
rules of international law are relevant to the interpretation of WTO agree-
ments.34 Joost Pauwelyn draws the distinction between the substantive ju-
risdiction of WTO panels, which is limited to claims under WTO covered
agreements, and the law to be applied in resolving those claims which po-
31 Joseph H.H. Weiler, in writing about the 'democracy deficit' of majoritarian processes
in the European Union, terms this a problem of social legitimacy. See WEILER, supra note
20, at 2466-73.
32 HOWSE & MUTUA, supra note 12, at 4.
33 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399 (1998). The argument is that articles 3(2) and 7 of the DSU incor-
porate the sources of international law in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. Article 3(2) does provide that the dispute settlement system serves to clarify pro-
visions of the agreements "in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law." This phrase appears to refer only to the rules of interpretation codified in
the Vienna Convention on Treaties, not the wider body of customary international law. See
Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 333, n.41
(1999).
34 Palmeter & Petros, supra note 33, at 412-13.
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tentially includes all norms of international law. He asserts that because
WTO rules are part of a wider body of public international law, non-WTO
rules of international law apply in WTO adjudication unless the members
have specifically contracted out of a particular norm.35 In his view, cus-
tomary international law, for example, not only appropriately fills gaps in
WTO treaty law, but also may apply before a WTO panel in a manner that
overrules WTO rules. 6 In his approach non-WTO norms may inform the
meaning of WTO agreements as long as such rules do not go beyond or
against the clear meaning of the interpreted term. In addition, other later
treaties may override WTO rules based on the consent of the parties.3 7 The
recent Shrimp/Sea Turtle decision lends some support to this model, par-
ticularly the interpretive approach of Pauwelyn.38 In the Shrimp/Sea Turtle
decision, the AB utilized international environmental treaties and the goal
of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO agreement to inter-
pret the meaning of "exhaustable natural resources." One might also argue
that judicial activism is perhaps necessary in the current environment be-
cause other modes of lawmaking at the WTO are moribund or blocked.
The Contract Model, on the other hand, assumes that the WTO trade
regime is a self-contained system based on specific and detailed agreements
of sovereign states. This model analogizes states to individuals in domestic
societies who create law voluntarily through their contractual relations. Na-
tions accept limited obligations, including the opening of markets and non-
discrimination in exchange for reciprocal commitments by other states.
Contractualists see the WTO as primarily comprised of rules and devoid of
the authority to engage in judicial lawmaking. Rather, member states con-
tract out of general international law norms under the doctrine of lex spe-
cialis.39 Under this model, the incorporation of new policy concerns
requires a renegotiation of the basic bargain. A new substantive policy,
without specific agreement by all nations to be bound, would diminish a
member's basic rights under the agreements and might require a conces-
sion.
Whereas a modified contractual approach is preferable, a pure contrac-
tual regime is perhaps impossible. Even a detailed rule-oriented system
could not foresee all future circumstances or eliminate all ambiguities. The
WTO Agreements are, in fact, comprised of both rules and standards.4°
35 Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 537-39.
36 Id. at 577.
37 Id. at 572-73.
38 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/AB/R, (98-3899), 173 (Oct. 12, 1998) [here-
inafter Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report].
39 See Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y. BK. INT'L L. 111 (1985).
40 See Trachtman, supra note 33, at n.97 (discussing rules versus standards literature in
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Rules define with particularity the conduct required. Standards, such as the
term "necessary" in the Article XX(b) exception for human and animal
health regulations, provide general guidance to the decisionmaker, but do
not specify in detail the conduct required.4' New circumstances require
judgments about the boundaries of norms and their application.42 Such un-
forseen circumstances, gaps and ambiguities create opportunities for judi-
cial activism. However, the incompleteness of agreements is not, in and of
itself, a justification for judicial activism.
An assessment of the appropriate role of the AB in a world of gaps and
ambiguities requires (1) a determination of what model, in general, member
states have chosen to develop policy; and (2) an analysis of the policy im-
plications of choosing judicial activism as a mode of articulating social pol-
icy in an international legal regime. Based on this assessment, this article
will develop principles that should guide the interpretation of WTO agree-
ments and their application to new problems.
Which model or combination of models have member states choosen
for allocating legislative authority between states and the dispute settlement
system? Turning first to the older GATT regime, 43 the history and structure
of GATT 1947 appears more consistent with the Contract Model than the
Judicial Activist model. The GATT agreement was negotiated by only
twenty-three trading partners on a reciprocal basis.44 The dispute settlement
system was not mandatory, and panel decisions were adopted only if there
was a consensus in favor of the report permitting a 'contracting party' to opt
out of the system.45 The power of even one nation to block a report dis-
couraged judicial activism. GATT norms were clarified and norms added
through serial rounds of trade negotiations.4 6 Significant changes required
the context of the WTO).
41 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557,
559-60 (1992).
42 For an extended discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of rules versus broader
approaches to judging, see Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953
(1995).
43 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS
188. [hereinafter GATT 1947]. As a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the
1947 GATT agreement became annexed to the WTO Agreement. See General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS, 33 1.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
44 See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (2d ed., 1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON. WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM].
45 For a description of the GATT 1947 dispute system and the weaknesses of this system,
see BHALA, WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 196-200.
46 There were seven rounds of trade negotiations between 1947 and 1985. The first five
rounds were primarily devoted to tariff reduction. The subsequent Kennedy and Tokyo
rounds began to address the more contentious nontariff barriers. See JACKSON, WORLD
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the consent of other trading partners. The primary mode of responding to
new problems was to negotiate 'side agreements' among those nations will-
ing to consent to the new or clarified norms. The nine new agreements and
four 'understandings' that were negotiated during the Tokyo round, such as
a detailed code for countervailing duties and for customs valuations, were
side agreements subscribed to by less than one-half of the members and ap-
plied only to transactions among those signatories. 47 This contactual or
'side agreement' approach permitted the development of policy, but at the
loss of the universality of the trading system.
The new WTO agreements, however, fundamentally changed the struc-
ture and process of dispute resolution. Dispute settlement is now compul-
sory with no opportunity to block panel reports.48 Panel decisions may be
appealed to the AB on legal issues, thereby promoting uniformity of norm
interpretation and consistency in application. 49 Because AB decisions are
automatically adopted as decisions of the DSB unless there is a consensus
against the decision, dispute settlement reports now have a greater degree of
finality.
In an important respect, the WTO continued the tradition of a contrac-
tual treaty-based regime. The WTO agreements define members' obliga-
tions and the benefits that they receive in exchange for their contractual
commitments. In the Japan Alcoholic Beverages case, the AB stated that,
"[T]he WTO is a treaty-the international equivalent of a contract. In ex-
change for the benefits member states expect to derive as Members of the
WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the com-
mitments they made in the WTO Agreement." 50 However, the process of
interpretation and the elucidation of general standards by the AB provides
the opportunity to exercise considerable discretion in the development of
WTO law through judicial decision-making.5'
The DSU appears to authorize only a contractual rule-applying system
rather than one that incorporates non-WTO norms or delegates authority to
modernize agreements. Losing parties have an obligation to comply with
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 44, at 73-78.4 71 Id. at 75-78.
48 If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established, at the latest, at the
DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's
agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. See
DSU, supra note 5, at art. 6.1.4 9 
Id. at art. 17.
50 WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2,
WTO DS 8/AB/R at 15 (Oct. 4, 1996).
51 For an argument that the WTO dispute resolution is creating a 'new frontier' of trade
law contributing to the development of international law, see Donald M. McRae, The WTO
in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?, 3 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 27, 27-41
(2000).
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AB decisions; members effectively have a choice of responses to an adverse
52decision including the option to pay compensation or face retaliation.
This flexible approach preserves a measure of sovereignty and permits
member states to not comply when important domestic interests would
make compliance politically difficult. Such a safety valve with weak en-
forcement tools is concerned with sovereignty and national autonomy, not a
mature legal system focused on where judges play an undefined, yet sig-
nificant role, in articulating norms for a community.
The provisions of the DSU defining the WTO legal system are incom-
patible with both the incorporation of non-WTO norms as rules of decision
and a creative interpretive role for the AB. Article 3.2 of the DSU clarifies
the appropriate role of the AB and panels: "[R]ecommendations and rulings
of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements. 53 Members' rights would be diminished if the AB
incorporated non-WTO norms to modify member rights, overrule WTO
rules, or justify trade sanctions not specifically excepted from WTO rules.
The incorporation of non-WTO law in a manner that diminishes rights or
gives priority to international norms over negotiated rights, such as the right
of access to markets, would violate the bargain struck in the DSU.54 For
example, the incorporation of non-WTO legal norms would be inconsistent
with DSU Article 3.5 requiring that all solutions reached under the dispute
settlement provisions or by consultation be consistent with the agreements
and not impair benefits such as access to markets.
55
Similarly, the argument that treaties should be later used to interpret
WTO agreements appears to be specifically excluded by the DSU. Article
52 The DSU permits the payment of compensation or the authorization of the suspension
of concessions if a member fails to comply within a reasonable time. DSU, supra note 5, at
art. 22.
53
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictabil-
ity to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights
and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSU cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations pro-
vided in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3.2.
54 This point of view is contrary to the view of many commentators who would place the
WTO regime within a hierarchy of international legal norms or advocate the use of non-
WTO norms to justify actions contrary to WTO norms. See supra text accompanying notes
32-37.
55 "All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and disputes settlement
provisions of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with
those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under
those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements." DSU,
supra note 5, at art. 3.5
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3(2) clarifies that the central purpose of the dispute system is to provide se-
curity and predictability to the trading system defined as preserving the
rights and obligations under the agreements and clarifying existing provi-
sions. 6 These provisions articulate a contractual, law-applying system de-
signed to preserve existing bargains rather than delegate to AB judges the
authority to interpret WTO provisions in light of their perceptions of chang-
ing policy concerns.
The sole exception to this analysis is the specific incorporation into
WTO law of the "customary rules of interpretation of public international
law." 57 Article 3(2) specifically incorporates only the customary rules of
interpretation of treaties and excludes those rules of international law that
would diminish members' rights and obligations. Rather than incorporate
international law generally, as Palmeter and Mavroidis suggest, this provi-
sion evidences a common sense and efficient agreement to utilize the exist-
ing interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on Treaties when
interpreting WTO agreements.58 Without such a designation, the AB would
be required to develop its own rules of interpretation on a case by case ba-
sis.
The incorporation of the rules of interpretation was chosen by the par-
ties and is consistent with a contractual approach. This provision limits the
discretion of the AB by choosing the textual approach of the Vienna Con-
vention and by implication excluding other more teleological forms of in-
terpretation. 9 Any substantive law creating functions the AB may possess
must be interstitial, giving definition to vague or ambiguous terms within
the parameters of existing rights and obligations. The WTO agreements do
not delegate to the AB and should not be read to delegate the authority to
interpret agreements in a manner that modifies negotiated bargains.
The conclusion that the DSU creates an essentially self-contained sys-
tem with regard to substantive norms is strengthened by the DSU approach
56 Id. at art. 3.2
57 1d
58 The WTO's AB has interpreted the phrase "customary rules of interpretation of public
international law" in article 3.2 to refer to the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
AB-1996-2, WTO/DS 8,10,1 1/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) at 9 (citing WTO Appellate Body Report
on United States-Standards for Reformulated of Conventional Gasoline, AB-1996-1,
WT/DS2/AB/R at 17 (Apr. 29, 1996)). For an argument that the reference to customary.
rules of interpretation is being interpreted more broadly to refer to the rules of international
law generally, see McRae, supra note 5 1, at 37-8.
5 See Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 8638. The European Court of
Justice, for example, has adopted a teleological approach to achieve its perception of the
goals of the community. This expansive interpretive style is, in part, responsible for the per-
ceived "democracy deficit" within the European community. See WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, supra note 20, at 51-63.
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to remedies. Member states agree to forego the self-judging assessment of
a violation under general international law and contract out of the remedies
available under international law.60 Article 23 enables member states to
seek redress through the DSU only after member states agree not to make a
determination that a violation has occurred. Member states must also sus-
pend concessions after DSB authorization and in accordance with DSU
procedures.61
This analysis of the DSU is not mere formalism. The DSU unequivo-
cally articulates the allocation of authority among the institutions of the
WTO, much like a constitution, and specifically requires the consent of the
governed states for interpretations and amendments. Such an allocation of
authority makes sense in the international trade context because the inevita-
ble clash of culture and interests in international social policy formulation
requires a political process for effective resolution.
While the DSU does not formally delegate lawmaking authority to the
AB to modernize agreements or authorize the application of non-WTO law
to determine disputes, it is argued that legislatures, or in this case member
nations, intentionally or unintentionally delegate a measure of legislative
authority to dispute resolution bodies through the process of interpreting in-
complete provisions or the definition of general standards. 62 Incomplete-
ness may be the result of the failure to decide a difficult political issue or
the intention to defer contentious policy decisions to judicial interpreta-
63tion .
There is, however, a crucial distinction between the AB determining
policy left incomplete because of a failure to agree and the interstitial de-
velopment of vague standards. Policy decisions that are avoided or de-
ferred leave intact existing bargains. In Articles 3.2 and 3.5, the DSU
clarifies that the purpose of the dispute resolution system is to give effect to
members' rights multilaterally negotiated. These provisions effectively ar-
60 See Kuyper, supra note 16, at 251-52.
61 Subsection (2) provides:
In such cases, Members shall: (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has oc-
curred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance
with the rules and procedures of this understanding, and shall make any such determination consis-
tent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an ar-
bitration award rendered under this understanding.
DSU, supra note 5, at art. 23
62 Trachtman suggests that the incomplete or standard-like nature of treaty provisions
may be seen as a legislative decision to delegate authority to dispute resolution bodies. See
TRACHTMAN, supra note 33, at 346.
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ticulate a default rule for occasions when there are deferred issues or no law
to apply (non liquet) in agreements - any expansion or diminution of mem-
bers rights or obligations must be reserved for member states to determine.
Interstitial development within existing bargains is an inevitable prob-
lem of law application and implicit even in a system of contractual rules
and standards. 64 Implicit in the interprative function is the narrow discre-
tion to define standards based on experience as long as such clarifications
do not diminish the overarching concern regarding members' rights. This
principle helps define the boundary of the lawmaking discretion of the AB.
Thus, the DSU evidences an institutional choice not to delegate new policy
development, even wise policy development, to adjudicatory bodies. The
AB would exceed its institutional mandate if it made new substantive pol-
icy. The fundamental concern is that judicial innovation diminishes the ne-
gotiated rights of states in a regime characterized by a delicate balance of
rights and advantages.
Nevertheless, several commentators suggest that the articulation of
standards inevitably permits dispute resolution bodies an enlarged policy-
making role and that the choice of standards over rules may be seen as an
implicit delegation from legislators.65 This more textured approach has
some resonance in the domestic context. Both the implied delegation and
the implied acceptance of international rules did not specifically exclude
justifications for judge-made law are unpersuasive when applied to WTO
dispute resolution.
The primary advantage of judge-made law is that it provides a mecha-
nism to evolve legal policy when the legislature is blocked or plagued by
inertia.66 There is a long precedent for judge-made law in the United States
Supreme Court and in the European Court of Justice, but it is controversial
because it implies that unelected judges can exercise legislative power.67
Justifications for judicial policy-making are inappropriate at the WTO in a
64 Application and interpretation over time may provide greater specificity to standards.
See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 964-65.
65 TRACHTMAN, supra note 33, at 376. The suggestion of Pauwelyn that international
rules not specifically contracted out may be applied in WTO adjudication may be seen as a
similar delegation to the judiciary.
66For a particularly thoughtful analysis of this and other justifications see GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91, 91-119 (1982). Calabresi sup-
ports the use of interpretative powers by courts to modernize and improve outdated statutes
as a necessary allocation of the burden of inertia because the legislature has been inattentive
to this problem and court interpretations can be overturned by the legislature. Id. at 118-
119 163-171.
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980). Alexander Bickel termed it the countermajoritarian difficulty. ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
16-18 (1962).
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number of crucial respects. First, the selection process and the qualifica-
tions of WTO judges do not suggest that they are political officials with leg-
islative discretion. Domestic courts are part of a political process in a
relatively cohesive society with broadly shared values. In domestic courts,
decisions are final, and in many societies there is a history of acquiescence
to such authority.68 U.S. Supreme Court justices, for example, are political
actors chosen by elected representatives for their political philosophies in
an openly political process. 69 The AB judges and WTO panelists, unlike
domestic law judges, are selected in a secret process devoid of democratic
accountability. Panelists are part-time officials chosen, in most cases, by a
technocrat for their trade experience and expertise rather than by elected of-
ficials accountable to the people. 70 AB judges are appointed by the DSB for
a four-year term, at least theoretically, based on their expertise and experi-
ence within the international trade community, not for their wider under-
standing of international law or for their political philosophy.7' Moreover,
the DSU blueprint does not provide the level of respect for AB decisions
that is normally accorded to domestic supreme courts. AB decisions, for
example, are not final until reviewed by the DSB, a political organ, and the
DSU delegates the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the agree.-
ments to the Ministerial Council and the General Council.72 The WTO
judicial selection process suggests an expert body with a narrow, interstitial
role, rather than a political position appointed and confirmed by elected
officials accountable for their judicial appointments.
Second, implicit delegation cannot be justified, as it has been in a do-
mestic context, on the basis that the legislature can reverse erroneous or im-
provident statutory interpretations and is thus not harmful in the long run to
democratic values. 73 Legislative reversal at the WTO would be extraordi-
68 For the classic argument that judges in the United States should engage in creative in-
terpretation in order to modernize statutes, an endeavor analogous to WTO judicial activism,
see CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 91-119.
69 For a discussion of the necessarily political nature of the selection of Supreme Court
Justices see David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: The Senate, the Constitution and
the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L. J. 1491 (1992).
70 Art. 8 of the DSU describes the formal requirements. See DSU, supra note 5, at art. 8.
For a discussion of practice, see BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 8, at 244.
In practice, panelists have some expertise and experience in the diplomatic community, but
they lack legal training and are forced to rely on the Secretariat's staff for legal advice. See
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 34-5 (1999).
71 DSU, supra note 5, at art. 17.1-3. There was apparently a contentious selection process
for the initial group of AB judges. The compromise apportioned the judges by nationality
and geographical regions. See Hudec, supra note 70, at 38.
WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at art. IX 2.
73 Calabresi argues that interpretive revisions are a necessary allocation of the burden of
inertia when a legislature is inattentive to a problem and court interpretation can be over-
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narily difficult. Reversal would require either a new negotiated agreement
based on consent or the use of the interpretation or amendment procedures
discussed above. Any significant policy decision is likely to benefit several
nations, providing them with an incentive not to agree to a reversal or to
demand a concession in return.
74
Third, compulsory adjudication is only possible because WTO law is
based on relatively precise rules and the assumption that the fundamental
rights in the system, such as the right of access, nondiscrimination, and na-
tional treatment will not be diminished except through bargained negotia-
tions. Negotiated agreements represent a precarious balance of advantages
and trade-offs. If these shared expectations are defeated, the WTO regime
will be undermined. Judicial policy-making that advantages some members
will inevitably disadvantage others, upsetting the balance in the system and
reducing the commitment of the disadvantaged nations to the trade regime's
norms and institutions.
The recent history of the trade regime does not suggest the delegation
of authority or the deferral of issues to the AB, but rather the generally suc-
cessful attempt to specify rules with greater clarity to avoid judicial innova-
tion. Many provisions in the GATT agreement that may appear to be
relatively open ended standards, such as the Article XX(b) exception for
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 75 or
the definition of subsidy, have been given greater specificity by negotiated
agreements and by detailed understandings interpreting various provi-
sions.76 The "necessary" concept could have been treated as open-textured
with space for non-protectionist unilateral sanctions. 77 Instead, states nego-
tiated the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement ("SPS"), which provided
detailed criteria for assessing the legality of domestic health and biosafety
standards. 78 The effect of this was to subject even nondiscriminatory health
measures to the discipline of the SPS agreement. 79 One can expect that na-
turned by the legislature. See CALABRESI, supra note 68, at 118-19.
74 Aware of the danger of judges imposing their values, Rogosta suggests that before
DSB decisions become final, they be subject to blocking by a substantial minority of coun-
tries to avoid creating new obligations to which these members did not consent. See John A.
Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO-Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the
Moniker "World Trade Court"?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739, 745-46 (2000).
75 GATT 1994, supra note 43, at art. XX (b).
76 See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, [here-
inafater WTO Agreement on Subsidies], Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
77 See Philip Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 658, 714-18 (1996) (ar-
guing to assess the "necessity" of a measure by determining if the motive of the legislature
was to promote a permissible purpose reflecting a given society's values, such as environ-
mental protection, or an impermissible one, such as protecting local industry).
78 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex IA, [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
79 See Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulations by World
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tions will amend and craft agreements with even greater specificity in the
future to forestall judicial legislation.
In concluding this survey of the three models, judicial activism appears
contrary to either the direct or the implied allocation of authority under the
WTO legal structure. Judicial activism is particularly inappropriate at the
WTO because there is no effective majoritarian structure for easy reversal
of decisions and because it undermines negotiated rights. Such judicial pol-
icy-making inherently disadvantages some states, reducing their bargaining
power in any subsequent negotiation.
III. ASSESSING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AS A PROCESS OF POLICY-MAKING
The above discussion demonstrates that the legal argument for the
delegation of express or implied authority to engage in judicial innovation
is tenuous at best. Rather, member states negotiated an institutional struc-
ture that more closely corresponds to the Contract Model than either the Ju-
dicial Activist or Legislative Models, specifically excluding norms or
interpretations that impair WTO rights and contracting out of international
law remedies. Nevertheless, in the few short years since its founding, the
AB has begun to expand its authority by incorporating non-WTO norms in
order to interpret WTO provisions and develop new doctrine.80 Beyond the
above mentioned legal authority concerns, there are several systemic rea-
sons why this nascent judicial activism should be curbed and the AB should
play no significant role in the development of WTO policy either through
the incorporation approach or the creative interpretation approach.
A. Democratic Legitimacy
Earlier, this article demonstrated that the implied delegation of legisla-
tive authority to the AB was incompatible with democratic accountablilty
because AB judges are not selected as political actors and their activist de-
cisions are not readily reversible by democratically accountable means. Ju-
dicial activism at the WTO raises other more fundamental concerns about
the legitimacy and viability of such decisions. First, member states of the
statist WTO community are deprived of their right to participate in and con-
sent to policy decisions that affect their rights and obligations. Policy deci-
sions are made by unelected AB judges rather than by the consent of the
governed states reversing the structure of governance in the DSU.81 In the
Trade Rules, 13 TuL. ENv. L.J. 271, 272-73 (2000).
80 In the Shrimp/Sea Turtle case, for example, the AB announced an "evolutionary" ap-.
proach to interpretation and referred to international environmental treaties to inform their
conclusion that living creatures constitute "exhaustible natural resources" in the article
XX(p) exception. Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report, supra note 38, 185-86.8 DSU, supra note 5, at art. 9, 10. These provisions provide a detailed process of consen-
sus or supermajoritarian decisionmaking for amendments that alter the rights and obligations
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Shrimp/Turtle case, for example, the AB made the determination that living
creatures constituted "exhaustible natural resources" not by ascertaining the
textual bargain negotiated by members, but by looking to international in-
struments in a different context. 82 In doing so, the AB announced a new
"evolutionary" method of interpretation 83 that is contrary to the textual ap-
proach in the Vienna Convention mandated by the DSU.8 4 The AB asserted
that the provisions of Article XX(g) must be read in light of contemporary
concerns of the international community about the protection and conserva-
tion of the environment.85 This conclusion renders the more relevant excep-
tion, Article XX(b) for animal health and life,
86 redundant and useless. 87
Most significantly, the effect of this decision is to permit the unilateral im-
position of trade sanctions to enforce U.S. perceptions of appropriate con-
servation policy and the appropriate remedy.
Such unbargained for policy innovation has the additional effect of re-
ducing the bargaining power in subsequent negotiations of those states,
primarily in developing countries, that have lost market access. This shift
in bargaining power makes it less likely that developing countries will re-
ceive compensation or financial assistance to help offset the additional costs
necessitated by complying with western perceptions of wise environmental
policy.
Second, judicial activism undermines the legitimacy of WTO decisions
within each members' society, because important policy decisions will have
been made without the assent of its elected officials. Neither citizens of
member states nor their elected representatives will have had a voice in
such decisions or the legal criteria that will determine the legality of future
member state actions. This is a problem of both legal and social legitimacy.
It is unlikely that the majority of the citizens of most cultures are ready to
accept important social policy decisions made by unelected international of-
ficials. The AB risks undermining the legitimacy of the trade regime when
important regulatory policies are made by unelected officials without clear
delegated authority and without a ready means of making these decisions
accountable to the people. New agreements under the contractual approach,
on the other hand, are ordinarily presented to the legislature in democratic
societies for approval. Elected representatives would have the opportunity
to consent to any new policy that would change their rights and place limits
of members.
82 Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report, supra note 38, 127-34.
83 Id. 130.
84 DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3(2).
85 Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report, supra note 38, 129.
86 GATT 1994, supra note 43, at art. XX(b).
87 Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 477, 482
(1999).
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on their sovereignty.
Third, in those circumstances where AB policy-making permits a na-
tion to utilize unilateral sanctions to achieve social regulatory goals, the
practical effect of that choice is inconsistent with basic notions of democ-
ratic accountability. 88 Such decisions permit one nation to apply its idio-
syncratic social policies extraterritorially on other nations without the
participation or consent of the elected representatives of those societies.
The balance of species conservation and costs was determined in Washing-
ton, D.C., not in the nations of Southeast Asia or Latin America. The
Shrimp/Sea Turtle decision permits the United States or indeed any country,
if it meets the conditions of the chapeau, to dictate how shrimp are to be
caught in the domestic waters of Southeast Asia, even though the citizens of
the affected countries have neither the opportunity to influence those regu-
lations nor the means to change them.
From an international perspective that is respectful of the choices of
other cultures, the wisdom of unilateral sanctions is always suspect. Citi-.
zens of developing nations are more concerned with daily surivial than a
high level of environmental quality, and hope for economic development to
improve the prospects for their children. The priorities of these citizens are
necessarily different than those in wealthy post-industrialist societies and
should be represented. Moreover, domestic social regulations that prescribe
how goods must be produced are the product of internal interest group pres-
sure that includes both environmental NGOs and the affected domestic in-
dustry. The local industry has a parochial economic interest in increasing
the costs of producing imported goods in order to make their goods more
competitive.89 The citizens of developing nations with little disposable in-
come would not, on their own, choose the expensive environmental and la-
bor regulation that citizens of the most advanced developed nations can
afford. When developed countries are permitted to impose their social
regulations on other nations extraterritorially, citizens of affected member
states face the stark choice of losing their right of access to markets, or their
democratic right to elect officials who make important social policy deci-
sions that affect them.
88 See Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Estab-
lishing Normative Priniciples, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 297,305-8 (1996).
89 McGinnis and Movesian argue that the most important function of WTO adjudication
is to restrain protectionist groups, thereby promoting free trade and a Madisionian democ-
racy, relatively free of the harmful effects of faction. See John McGinnis & Mark Movesian,
The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514-16 (2000). For evidence that
there may have been a protectionist motive as well as a conservationist one for the U.S. tuna
embargo under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-
Dolphin Controversy, the World Trade Organization and the Liberal Project to Reconceptu-
alize International Law, 5 Y.B. Int'l Envtl. L. 1, 17-18 (1995).
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Advocates of unilateral sanctions argue that Thailand need not adopt
the U.S. regulations unless it wishes to export its shrimp to the U.S.90
While true, this argument ignores that Thailand has the right under the
GATT 1994 agreement to export its products free of nontariff barriers that
ban or restrict its imports unless the product itself creates a risk to human or
animal health just as the United States enjoys with regard to the export of
hormone feed beef.91 Moreover, Thailand does not have a practical choice.
The absence of a practical alternative to exporting to their largest market is
essential to the U.S. policy which is to find a mechanism that affects behav-
ior both conserving sea turtles and leveling costs. While I am supportive of
efforts to conserve both sea turtles and dolphins, the better approach, con-
sistent with the democratic principles of the United States, is either multi-
lateral cooperation or agreements. Domestic labeling is also preferable to
government imposed import bans because labeling permits access to mar-
kets increasing competition and enables consumers to determine which
products will be purchased and ultimately produced.
One of the perverse aspects of this unilateral approach is that one na-
tion is able to select the environmental policy that appears important within
its internal political dynamic, while other, more important environmental
problems are ignored. The United States, for example, has pulled out of the
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocols on Climate Control while it is exclud-
ing tuna and shrimp from its markets in order to protect species in decline.
Yet, if projections of the potential damage to environmental systems by
global warming are anywhere near accurate, coral reefs and endangered
tropical species that feed upon them will die, forested areas will become de-
serts, and many island ecosystems will be inundated, offsetting any possible
gains from the marine mammal protection legislation. 92 Facing such a
prospect, member states in tropical areas, such as Thailand or endangered
island nations, may well have different environmental priorities than the
American domestic political choice of sea turtles over climate control.
While I would prefer both to protect sea turtles and to minimize global
warming, the choice among alternative approaches to conserve animal and
human life should be matters of international political negotiations, not uni-
lateralism.
This unilateralist approach has its costs even for an economically pow-
erful nation like the United States. If unilateralism is to be permitted, other
90 Robert Howse & Don Regan, The Product/Process Distinction - An Illusory Basis for
Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 249, 274 (2000).
91 GATT 1994, supra note 43, at art. XI. (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports
including bans).
92 For a discussion of the potential impact of climate change on ecosystems, see DAVID
HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 594-99 (2d ed. 2002).
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nations would now have, at least, a prima facie justification under Article
XX(g) for the non-discriminatory exclusion of U.S. products, such as steel
or automobiles, produced in a manner that emit greenhouse gases. If other
nations have the audacity to impose their views of rational environmental
policy on the United States, the United States would surely retaliate under
the banner of national sovereignty. Unilateral sanctions risk the trade war
cycle of retaliation and counter retaliation.
The fundamental defect of judicial activism is one of process. Judicial
activism necessarily implies the selection of preferred values among the
constellation of values and interests that exist in our diverse world by a
small group of unelected individuals. The preferred method of resolving
conflicting values and interests in democratic societies is a political process
in which all interests are represented and the decisionmakers are account-
able to the people. There are far more interests and more effective policy
alternatives to resolve environmental and other social policy issues than can
be represented in adjudication or within the body politic of one nation.
B. The Uncertain and Manipulable Nature of Customary International Law
Advocates of judicial activism place great faith in customary interna-
tional law ("CIL") as a means to infuse environmental, human rights, or la-
bor values into WTO decision-making. Some argue that the norms of
customary international law are superior to treaty norms and should prevail
in the event of conflict.93 Others make textual arguments that CIL norms
are incorporated into the WTO through their expansive interpretations of
the DSU.94 Here, I address whether CIL is a viable source of legitimate
norms in a world of conflicting values and interests.
CIL is said to be formed by the general and consistent practice of states
accepted by them as law.95 It consists of two elements: (1) state practice,
which is the behavioral evidence of custom; and (2) the opiniojuris re-
quirement, i.e., the attitude or belief by the international community that a
norm is legally required.96 Customary law is implicit law, i.e., behavioral
norms generally observed by all normal members of that society.97 The in-
93 HOWSE & MUTUA, supra note 12 at 7-8,12.
94 See Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 33.
95 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102(2)
(1987). See also THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ART. 38(1)(b) de-
fining international custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." For a gen-
eral discussion of CIL, see ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (4th ed.
1990).
96 Opiniojuris sive necessitatis is the conviction by states that a norm is required as an in-
ternational legal obligation. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Peter Malanczuk ed., 7th ed. 1997).
97 Anthropology literature clarifies that customary law is a social fact subject to observa-
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ternational community is not really a society, but rather a collection of
states comprised of many cultures without the shared values or common
histories of domestic societies. In this context, CIL suffers from a number
of crippling defects as a source of law to modify or trump the negotiated
norms of the WTO agreements.
98
First, there is no agreed upon methodology of determining state prac-
tice or the "general acceptance" of the world community. There are wide
differences of opinion on what counts as state practice that evidences be-
havior and on how to weigh the many different types of state practice.99
The more serious concern is that there is no objective way to determine
whether norms have, in fact, been "generally accepted" by the international
community. Nor is there a court of general jurisdiction with the final au-
thority to determine when custom has become binding and what states are
bound. Rather, "general acceptance" is a fiction that permits the individual
writer or judge to select their own preferred values. 00 Without an agreed
upon methodology it is impossible to objectively determine norms.
Second, the norms of CIL are uncertain and controversial, providing
unelected trade experts at the AB with the nearly unfettered discretion to
choose or create norms separate from political processes further exacerbat-
ing the legitimacy problem. Most norms of CIL are a matter of perception
and appear to vary from culture to culture. The primary substantive CIL
norms in the Restatement of Foreign Relations, for example, are not per-
ceived as customary obligations by many nations of the world.'0 ' The as-
serted obligation to pay full market value as compensation for expropriation
is the political position of the United States. It has been continuously op-
tion. See IAN HAMNETT, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND LAW 7-1 1(1. Ham-
nett ed., 1977). While some international law scholars have recognized that the existence of
custom is a question of fact, few engage in the necessary inquiry. See e.g., LASSA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
98 For an extensive analysis of the defects of CIL legal theory, see J. Patrick Kelly, The
Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000).
99 There is a fundamental disagreement on whether only physical acts count as state prac-
tice or whether statements and declarations constitute state practice. For a discussion of the
physical act approach, see D'AMATO, supra note 95, at 88-90. Others argue that such a the-
ory would encourage the use of force in order to protect one's rights when diplomacy fails.
See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source ofInternational Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
40 1974-75).
00 See Kelly, supra note 98, at 469-75.
101 For the proposition that states have an international obligation to prevent injury to the
environment of another state and are internationally responsible for any significant injury,
compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 95, at § 601; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing
the New International Law of the Environment, 35 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 303 (1992);
Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995); Karl Zemenak, State Responsibility and Liability in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 188 (W. Lang et. al. eds.,
1991) (fails to see widespread, consistent state practice).
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posed by the nations of Latin America since the early nineteenth century
and today is a minority view among nations.
10 2
Third, customary norms and norms in international instruments said to
be evidence of custom, such as the Stockholm Declaration on the Environ-
ment or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are vague and conflict-
ing. The reconciliation of values and principles should be determined in the
realm of politics, not by judges. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
for example, provides little guidance on how to reconcile a nation's right to
engage in economic development with the general goal of sustainable de-
velopment. 0 3 Wise policy principles, such as sustainable development,
should be reconciled with the goal of economic development through the
use of incentives and disincentives in political negotiations. This approach
proved successful in negotiating the Montreal Protocol to reduce ozone de-
pleting chemicals. 10 4 Developing nations, including China and India,
agreed to ratify the Protocol after developed countries, the historical sources
of the ozone problem, created a Multilateral Fund to provide grants for
technical assistance on new substitute technology and agreed to de minimis
emissions during a transition period for developing countries.1
0 5
Fourth, CIL process is a poor lawmaking process in a world of over
180 states with diverse values and interests. Few nations have historically
participated in the formation of norms said to be customary and the views
of dissenting states have been ignored.10 6 The CIL process is incompatible
with the process values of democratic governance. CIL does not permit the
wide-ranging negotiation by all members of the world community, the de-
liberative consideration of alternative policy solutions, or provide a forum
102 For the position of the United States that states have a duty to pay full compensation
for the expropriation of foreign owned property, compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
95 at § 712 (particularly comment d); Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran (Partial Award), 15
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 223, 234 (1987); S.N. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States For
Injuries To Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863, 889
(1961); E. Jimenez de Archega, The Duty to Compensate for the Nationalization of Foreign
Property, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 237, 239 (1963). For the position that just compensation
will vary with the circumstances, see Oscar Schacter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 124-25 (1984).
103 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21 provides: "States have the sovereign right to ex-
ploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other States..." Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
104 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522
U.N.T.S. 3 (1987). The Protocol contained a phase-out of ozone depleting chemicals.
105 The London Agreements of 1990 amending the Protocol created a multilateral fund.
See Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 10,
30 1.L.M. 541, 550 (1991) at art. 10. See generally, RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE
DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 183-88 (1991).
106 For a discussion of the participation problem, see Kelly, supra note 98 at 519-23.
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to reconcile diverse values.10 7 This outdated process, which may have made
some sense in the nineteenth century world of poor communications and
difficult travel, is no longer a wise or effective process of lawmaking in a
diverse world. An effective international policy process requires a clear rit-
ual, such as the signing and ratification of a treaty that marks the time when
the norm has become binding, clarifies the contours of the norm, and indi-
cates which nations are bound. If the AB were to assume the authority to
determine which asserted norms of customary international law to incorpo-
rate, there would be a large transfer of power from states to an unelected,
unrepresentative body.
Both the incorporation theory and creative interpretation theory assume
that broadly shared values and norms among the nations exist and can be
drawn upon to clarify incomplete agreements or fill gaps. This may be ap-
propriate in relatively homogenous domestic societies where common goals
and historical tradition may provide the values and shared norms to clarify
legislation, but the international system is composed of many different cul-
tural traditions and significantly different perspectives on the appropriate
way to balance social policy goals. Only a contractual approach has the ca-
pacity to ameliorate these large differences in economic interests and the
variety of policy perspectives among nations.
C. The Morality of Judicial Activism
Judicial activism at the WTO creates a fundamental moral problem that
affects the viability of norms. The norms asserted for inclusion by U.S. and
European social activists are essentially western values associated with in-
dividualism, such as labor rights, or the recent policy preferences of rela-
tively-wealthy western societies, including the protection for sea mammals.
These worthy objectives are or will be imposed on poor developing nations
without their input or an assessment of the impact on local economies.
Those who would ban products produced with child labor, for example,
have little understanding of the harsh reality of poverty in overpopulated
developing countries, the lack of educational opportunities for children
without resources, and the absence of alternative sources of family income
for all too many in these countries.108 People living in squatter settlements,
bathing in sewers, and suffering from poverty related diseases would hap-
107 For a summary of views about the procedural defects of customary international law,
see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Interna-
tional Law. A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 767-68 (2001).
108 See e.g., Drusilla Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child
Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE POLICY (Alan Deardorff & Robert
Stem, eds., 2000).
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pily choose work that would violate our modem labor laws. 10 9 The labor
laws of wealthy nations should not be imposed on developing societies, just
as they were premature during our own early industrialization in the nine-
teenth century.
Most significant are the economic consequences. Imposing western
environmental and labor standards upon nations at different stages of eco-
nomic development interferes with their economic development either by
excluding their imports or by increasing production costs. Many of these
additional costs are luxuries that Western nations could not afford them-
selves at a comparable stage of development. Child labor laws, occupa-
tional safety laws, and minimum wage legislation are important
components of our modem civilization, but they are products of a relatively
wealthy middle class society. Even our wealthy society continues to have
exemptions for agricultural industries from these laws. Rather than initiate
proactive policies that finance programs to encourage parents to place their
children in schools, the United States restricts trade on labor rights grounds
that injure the economies of developing countries and impose hidden costs
on the U.S. economy. 0 There is considerable evidence that trade sanctions
are the wrong strategy to improve environmental conditions or human
rights. As a recent World Bank report demonstrates, cleaner air and water,
as well as concern for endangered species, increases with income."' Meas-
ures that limit trade inhibit economic growth, hindering development and
slowing the growth of demand for environmental protection.
This imposition of western values and inappropriate priorities on na-
tions at a different stage of economic development is often perceived as a
problem of cultural imperialism. " 2 The moral problem, however, is not just
the inappropriateness of the policies, but it is the act of imposition itself
which strains the necessary moral basis of many international norms. The
heavy-handed use of economic sanctions coerces nations to do that which
they perceive is not in their interest and will make them poorer. A moral
component is necessary for many international norms, because compliance
109 For a criticism of the political pressure in the United States to impose U.S. labor stan-
dards on developing nations, see Fareed Zakaria, Dick Gephardt, Unilateralist, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 10, 2001, at 37.
110 See Shaffer, supra note 11 at 639-44.
Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World, World Bank Policy
Research Paper # 23591 at 130 (2002) [hereinafter World Bank Report]. Where natural re-
sources are an important component of tourism and thus income and employment, as in the
Seychelles and Kenya, these assets are given special protection. Id. at 136-7.
112 See Christopher Wall, Human Rights and Economic Sanctions. the New Imperialism,
22 FORDHAM. INT'L L. J. 577, 609 (1998). In the area of human rights, nations place differ-
ent weight on the many possible human rights principles resulting in a battle of human rights
ideals. Multilateral trade sanctions are preferable because they remove some of the aura of
imperialism and cultural bias that accompanies unilateral action.
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with international norms is generally based on the perception of mutual ad-
vantage. If the AB approved the unilateral imposition of environmental
standards, as the Shrimp/Sea Turtle case appears to permit, at least in some
circumstances, there would be a rebellion by less developed countries in the
WTO, and compliance with other obligations would be threatened. The ex-
isting balance of advantages is far from satisfactory for developing coun-
tries. The recent World Bank report clarifies that while developed
countries' tariff rates are low generally, they maintain barriers in exactly
those areas where developing countries have a comparative advantage: ag-
riculture and labor-intensive manufacturing.' 13 Unilateralism for the
wealthy at the expense of the economic development of the poorer nations
has the potential to unravel the gains of the last fifty years.
IV. THE "CONTRACTUAL AUTHORITY" MODEL AND RECENT APPELLATE
BODY ACTIVISM
As demonstrated above, the Judicial Activist Model is inconsistent
with the institutional structure of the WTO, contrary to democratic legiti-
macy, and inconsistent with wise policy development in an international so-
ciety comprised of nations with wide differences in values and interests.
Nevertheless, the AB has, on occasion, created unbargained for substantive
norms, utilized putative international norms to interpret ambiguous or in-
complete terms, or crafted procedural norms not specifically negotiated.
Three important AB cases demonstrate the range of issues and the contex-
tual complexity of cases in which incorporation and creative interpretation
issues arise.
The first case, Shrimp/Sea Turtle, may be seen as a judicial activist de-
cision in several important respects. First, it may be read to condone unilat-
eral trade sanctions in order to conserve an exhaustible natural resource, sea
turtles, thereby permitting individual nations to impose their domestic envi-
ronmental standards on countries with weaker standards.' 14 Second, in in-
terpreting the term, "exhaustible natural resource," the AB adopted an
"evolutionary" approach to treaty interpretation, referring to "contemporary
concerns" of the international community about conservation, multilateral
treaties discussing natural resources, and the Preamble of the WTO Agree-
ment acknowledging sustainable development as an objective of the organi-
zation, rather than a strict textual approach.1 5 Finally, the AB interpreted
the term "arbitrary discrimination" in the chapeau of Article XX to require
113 World Bank Report, supra note 11l, at 55-59.
114 The opinion determined that the United States' unilateral measures met the various re-
quirements of the Article XX(g) exception and would be permissible if the requirements of
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that the certification process that is used to determine eligible countries be
conducted in a manner that provides basic due process protections, includ-
ing an opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to respond to arguments,
and the right to a written, reasoned opinion.116 Such a conclusion was not
obvious and is not clearly grounded in GATT 1994 or the DSU.
The European Bananas Case" 7 raised the issue of the AB's authority to
develop the procedural doctrine necessary to resolve substantive disputes.
The United States challenged the EC's preferential trading arrangement for
banana imports from certain developing countries, primarily former colo-
nies that participate in the Lome Convention.1 8 The European Community
argued that the United States lacked standing to file a complaint because, as
a nation that had never exported bananas and with minimal banana produc-
tion, the United States had no legal interest 1 9 The United States responded
that they had a significant commercial interest because two companies
based in the United States, Dole and Chiquita, exported bananas to Europe
from their Latin American holdings.120 The AB determined that the United
States had standing to contest the European Community's banana prefer-
ence scheme by creatively interpreting Article 3.7 of the DSU to conclude
that a "legal interest" is not required to request the formation of a panel.'
21
Article 3.7 merely provides that before bringing a case, a member shall ex-
ercise its judgment as to whether the action would be fruitful. 22 This por-
tion of Article 3.7 appears to be merely a caution to members to consider
the efficacy of a mutually acceptable settlement before filing a complaint,
not a statement of the law of standing.
Finally, the European Beef Hormone Case 2 3 raised the issue of
whether norms of customary international law modify or supervene the con-
tractual treaty norms of the WTO. The European Community had banned
the import of meat and meat products from farm animals treated with cer-
tain growth hormones. 24 While the rationale for the EC Hormone Direc-
tive had been that consumption of meat from such animals was dangerous
to human health, the World Health Organization had determined that most
"
6 Id. 180-84.
.7 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/Ds27/AB/R (issued 9 Sept. 1997, adopted 25 Sept. 1997) [hereinafter EC Ba-
nanas Report].
118 For a thoughtful analysis of this important case, see Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31
McGEORGE L. REv. 839 (2000).
119 EC Bananas Report, supra note 117, 17.120 id.
121 Id. 132.
122 DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3.7.
123 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), (Jan. 16,1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormone Report].
124 Id. 1-5.
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hormones are safe for human consumption and the European Community
could offer no scientific evidence of harm. 25 The EC argued that its meas-
ure was based on the precautionary principal which it termed a "general
customary rule of international law."126 The AB concluded that whatever
the status of that principle as customary law, it had not been written into the
SPS Agreement as a justification for adopting measures that were inconsis-
tent with the obligations of members and did not override the negotiated
principles of the SPS agreement requiring a risk assessment.'
27
Several commentators view these decisions as supportive of the gen-
eral incorporation of international law into WTO law and refutation of the
concept that the WTO is a contractual, self-contained system.128 I want to
suggest an analytical framework that attempts to reconcile the above deci-
sions, except the Shrimp/Sea Turtle case, in a more sophisticated contrac-
tual model that I call the "Contractual Authority" model. The concept of
"contractual authority" is that the delegation of authority to the AB includes
not only the specific norms negotiated in the WTO Agreements, but also the
implied authority to develop such other procedural norms as are necessary
to perform its fundamental duty "to preserve the rights and obligation of
members under the covered agreements.
'' 29
The "Contractual Authority" Model thus distinguishes substantive
from procedural norms. Nations have significantly different economic in-
terests with regard to substantive issues, such as whether the extraterritorial
regulation of how goods are produced is consistent with member's obliga-
tions. Procedural issues, on the other hand, generally do not have a differ-
ential economic impact on states, apart from their strategic role in a specific
litigation and need not be specifically negotiated. Moreover, the dispute
settlement regime could not achieve its fundamental purpose of preserving
members substantive rights unless the AB had the authority to make the
procedural rulings necessary to conduct litigation to enforce these rights. A
limited number of procedural choices were negotiated in the DSU, but it
would be impossible to predict and then negotiate all the potential proce-
dural issues that may arise in disputes to enforce rights secured under the
agreements. 130 The negotiation of the legion of arcane procedural issues
125 BHALA, supra note 8, at 1674-75.
126 Beef Hormone Report, supra note 123, 121. The EC argument was that the precau-
tionary principal entitled members to evaluate risks in a variety ways. Id. 121-23.
127 Id. 123-25. The Appellate Body observed that there was uncertainty as to whether
the precautionary principal had crystallized into customary international law and that the
precautionary principal had not been written into the SPS agreement as a ground to justify a
measure that otherwise violated the SPS. Id. 123-24.
28 See e.g., Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 33; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 12.
129 DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3.2.
130 Given the practical impossibility of negotiating all potential procedural issues, it was
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would be an inefficient use of trade negotiators time and of limited interest
to trade officials when such issues do not have a differential economic im-
pact on Members. Most significantly, if the AB did not have the authority
to resolve procedural disputes, procedural challenges could be manipulated
to undermine substantive rights. Unlike creative interpretation to create
substantive norms, the implicit authority to develop procedural rules is not
an unforeseen mental construct in order to justify judicial activism. Courts
in domestic societies normally assume such authority and international pan-
els throughout history have, in fact, exercised such authority.
13'
On the other hand, the DSU makes it abundantly clear that the AB has
not been delegated "contractual authority" to modify substantive rights and
obligations secured under the agreements.' 32 As a matter of wise policy
faithful to fundamental notions of national sovereignty and democratic le-
gitimacy, the implied delegation of contractual authority to create or modify
substantive norms should not be presumed when member states have fun-
damentally different positions and antagonistic economic interests with re-
gard to substantive norms. The longstanding position that developing
nations do not wish to even discuss environmental or labor standards in fu-
ture trade negotiations is incompatible with implied delegation to create
substantive norms.
V. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRADE
REGIME
From the "Constructive Authority" Model and the discussion above
about legal authority and democratic legitimacy, we are now in a position to
develop several principles of judicial restraint appropriate to the role as-
signed to the Appellate Body by the DSU while remaining faithful to the
general thrust of the WTO jurisprudence. The first principle, derived from
the "Contractual Authority" Model, is that the AB necessarily has a signifi-
cant lawmaking role in developing procedural law whereas it lacks the au-
thority to alter or diminish Members' substantive rights through either the
creative interpretation of terms in WTO Agreements or the incorporation of
international legal norms. Courts, in general, and the AB, in particular,
must, of necessity, develop a body of procedural law when there is little
guidance from a legislature. The DSU appears to contain little law with re-
gard to standing, burden of proof, mootness, and host of other procedural
issues that require judicial lawmaking. The necessary procedural rulings
inevitable that the panels and the Appellate Body engage in interstitial procedural rule-
making. BHALA, supra note 8, at 230-234.
131 See generally, GEORGE H. ALDERICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (1996).
132 Nations specifically agreed that rulings of the AB cannot create or diminish substan-
tive rights provided in the agreements. DSU, supra note 5, at art. 3(2).
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can be accomplished by the inventive interpretation of DSU provisions,
such as that of Article 3.7 in the European Bananas case, or by the articula-
tion of procedural rules or standards without a textual basis under its inher-
ent authority.
Similarly, the infusion of principles of fair process into the interpreta-
tion of the undefined standard, "arbitrary discrimination," in the Shrimp/Sea
Turtle case, is a procedural interpretation necessary to prevent the arbitrary
negation of rights and thereby achieve the substantive goals of the GATT
1994 agreement. 33 Without the requirements of transparency and reasoned
decision making, a nation would be able to manipulate the certification
process to deny member states their right to market access. In establishing
the new disputes system, members must have expected that the AB would
perform its function and develop the procedural rules and doctrine neces-
sary to resolve disputes under the substantive law of the WTO.
While the AB has generally avoided creative interpretation as a means
to modify substantive law and, on occasion, has appeared to reject the use
of customary international law to resolve WTO disputes, recent decisions
indicate a disturbing tendency to use other treaties and customary interna-
tional law in order to interpret WTO Agreements. In the European Beef
Case, the AB appeared to reject the incorporation of the customary interna-
tional law into the WTO regime in a manner that modifies contractual rights
and obligations. The AB explained that the 'precautionary principle,' even
if it were a principle of customary international law, would not override the
specific provisions of the SPS Agreement without a textual basis.
134
The Shrimp/Sea Turtle Case, however, raises several concerns about
the AB's use of its interpretive authority to expand the substantive rights of
economically powerful nations at the expense of the less developed. First,
an 'evolutionary' approach elevates current concerns in other contexts
above negotiated bargains and is therefore plainly inconsistent with the
AB's mandate to preserve members rights. It is not the AB's role to subjec-
tively assess the current position of the international community on prior
bargains. New bargains are the best evidence of current positions. Second,
each international treaty, environmental or otherwise, contains its own deli-
cate balance of perceived advantages and disadvantages. The meaning of a
term, such as 'exhaustible natural resources,' in one context may tell us lit-
tle about the meaning of a term negotiated for other purposes in 1947. This
artfully expanded Article XX(g) into the subject matter of the Article XX(b)
133 Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report, supra note 38 180-84. The AB found that the certifica-
tion process for exemption from the U.S. import ban on shrimp did not provide for an oppor-
tunity to be heard, the opportunity to respond to arguments, written notice of the denial, a
statement of reasons, or a procedure for review or appeal. Id. 180.
134 Beef Hormone Report, supra note 123 124-25.
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exception for human or animal health risks undermining the negotiated bar-
gain in Article XX(b) between access to markets and the exception for
regulations that are 'necessary' to protect human, animal, or plant life. 35
While this expansion of the Article XX(g) exception violates the prin-
ciple that the AB lacks the authority to alter members rights, the
Shrimp/Sea Turtle case should not be read as unqualified approval of uni-
lateral sanctions.'36 The AB opinion expressed a clear preference for multi-
lateral solutions to policy conflicts. 137 It further appeared to signal that the
"unjustifiable discrimination" clause in the chapeau will be read to encour-
age multilateral cooperation. 38 Moreover, the opinion warns that measures
that require other countries to adopt the same environmental standards
would be discriminatory unless there is an inquiry into the appropriateness
of applying the regulatory program to the differing conditions in the export-
ing countries.139 This may be read as a preference for performance stan-
dards rather than the command and control requirements of U.S. law. It
also suggests that applying the strict environmental controls of an advanced
developed country to countries in a different stage of economic develop-
ment may be discriminatory.
If the Shrimp/Sea Turtle decision were to evolve into an exception that
permits unilateral trade sanctions to enforce domestic environmental meas-
ures generally, then it would seriously undermine the metaprinciples of bar-
gained consent and state control that are the cornerstones of a contractual
regime that protects members sovereignty. Judicial policy-making by in-
corporating non-negotiated rights or obligations, such as the "precautionary
principle" or human rights to limit access to markets, will inevitably advan-
tage some members at the expense of others, upsetting the balance of rights
in the system. The AB recognized this concern when it stated that excep-
tions under Article XX would be read along with other substantive provi-
sions so that neither canceled out the other or impaired the balance of rights
and obligations in the GATT 1994 agreement itself. 40 It remains to be seen
whether it is possible to construct unilateral trade measures in a manner that
does not impair members' rights.
The second principle of judicial restraint, appropriate for a contractual
regime, is that, in circumstances in which a general policy issue has not
135 Article XX(b) provides that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent
measures that are necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.
136 Appleton argues that the AB's restrictive interpretation of the chapeau will limit the
use of the Article XX(g) exception as a justification for unilateralism. See Arthur E. Apple-
ton, Shrimp/Sea Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INTL. EcON. L. 477, 491- 94 (1999).
37 Shrimp/Sea Turtle Report, supra note 38 4 168.
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been decided by members or there is no law to apply, the AB's role is to de-
fer such issues to future negotiations of member states, not to attempt to
discern current community thinking on wise policy. Non liquet or no law to
apply situations should arise at the WTO with some frequency, because the
WTO Agreements are not a comprehensive system of norms, but rather a
limited set of contractual norms that modify members' sovereign preroga-
tives in order to attain mutual goals. The issue of whether living creatures
are an 'exhaustible natural resource' within the meaning of the Article XX
(g) exception in Shrimp/Sea Turtle case, was an issue not previously nego-
tiated and should have been deferred to member states for resolution. In
such situations, the AB should treat the issue as if it were a political ques-
tion inappropriate for adjudication. 14' Abstention follows from the default
rule that members' rights must be honored and deviations from such rights,
such as a loss of access to markets, require new negotiations.
The third principle that should guide judicial decisionmaking at the
WTO is that international practices and doctrine developed by other institu-
tions may provide useful guidance in developing a body of procedural law,
but they are not determinative and may be inappropriate. The experience of
other institutions, sometimes characterized as general rules of international
law, may provide alternative models for resolving procedural issues, but
they are not necessarily appropriate in the WTO context. In the EC Ba-
nanas case the AB wisely rejected the "legal interest" requirement for
standing to sue articulated by the International Court of Justice 42 and in-
stead developed a more liberal approach that permits each member consid-
erable discretion in deciding whether to bring an action. In the trade
context, all member states are potential exporters and all have an economic
interest in the rules being followed. 143 The AB necessarily should have the
discretion to frame procedural rules that best fit the circumstances of the
trade regime.
The fourth principle that should guide judicial decisionmaking at the
WTO is that customary international norms or other international agree-
ments should not be used as devices to infuse meaning into substantive pro-
visions of WTO agreements. Norms drawn from other contexts provide
few insights into the meaning of negotiated bargains. Neither specific envi-
ronmental treaties nor the general goal of sustainable development furnish
much guidance about the meaning of terms. Sustainable development is a
worthy goal and its principles should inform policy decisions, but it is
member states that must make policy decisions, not an unelected judicial
14 1 For a discussion of mediating techniques to avoid deciding the merits, see Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT. L. 733, 757-59 (1999).
142 See Southwest Africa cases, (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J.R. 4.
143 See BHALA, supra note 8, at 231-32.
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body lacking any semblance of democratic legitimacy. The "evolutionary"
interpretive methodology announced by the AB in the Shrimp/Sea Turtle
case misconstrues the AB's role in the WTO legal system. The AB is not
an institution with a teleological mission of developing a comprehensive
and cohesive system of international norms. It has the more mundane task
of resolving trade conflicts in light of existing and necessarily incomplete
rights and obligations negotiated by member states. Other sources of law
should not be used as a means for AB members to inject their own values
into a contractual regime.
The final principle is that the AB should not interpret the WTO agree-
ments in a manner to permit a nation to use unilateral trade sanctions to im-
pose social policy norms on the products of foreign states unless the
product itself creates a risk to human or animal health. When the United
States or Europe uses unilateral sanctions to impose standards, these nations
are applying a policy choice of highly developed, post-industrial societies
and the accompanying large costs, on newly or not yet industrialized coun-
tries without their consent or participation. The manner in which interna-
tional public policy problems are solved should be respectful of the impact
of unilateral solutions on others and respectful of the perspectives of other
cultures. The zero-sum nature of adjudication is inadequate to the task of
either balancing members' divergent interests or determining the most effi-
cacious way to achieve a policy goal. Unilateral sanctions to achieve policy
goals will undermine respect for WTO norms and the commitment to a sys-
tem of resolving disputes. There will be legitimacy costs to the entire sys-
tem for such a strategy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of WTO norms must rest on the consent of states.
WTO agreements are negotiated by states and ultimately approved, in many
cases, by national legislatures. Specific state consent and legislative ap-
proval supply the necessary democratic legitimacy within each domestic
political community. Whatever authority the AB possesses is delegated by
states through contractual agreements. The current legislative process at the
WTO is to articulate new norms and to refine existing obligations through
rounds of trade negotiations on a contractual basis. The contentious debates
and negotiations over the very language of issues for future negotiations at
trade rounds testifies to the deep policy divisions about environmental and
labor issues. 144 There is no other process that gives adequate attention to
the wealth of different values and interests among the nations and peoples
of the world. These interests and values cannot be reconciled by wise or
144 See Revised Draft Doha Declaration Issued; Harbison Outlines Possible Compro-
mises, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 720 (Nov. 1, 2001).
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progressive AB judges.
Judicial activism is the wrong process for developing social regulatory
policy at the WTO. It violates notions of democratic legitimacy, because it
diminishes the role of the majority of nations in policy-making and inher-
ently imposes policy choices on nations without their consent. Judicial ac-
tivism may be appropriate in a domestic society with broadly shared values
and a relatively cohesive political community, but it is inappropriate in the
international context for many of the reasons discussed above. AB judges
are not representative and they have no particular insight or mandate to rec-
oncile the conflicting values in international society. Most importantly, AB
decisions cannot be reversed by a legislature or other majoritarian process.
AB policy decisions that are well ahead of the values of many nations could
not be readily reversed by the DSB because any such policy decision would
be in the interest of some nations. The Judicial Activist Model may be effi-
cient, but it is undemocratic and will exacerbate conflict rather than resolve
it.
The problems of environmental degradation and inadequate labor stan-
dards can only be effectively addressed if all states participate in the devel-
opment of standards and are committed to them. Any attempt by the AB to
use customary international legal norms or creative interpretation to permit
unilateral sanctions will be self defeating. An efficacious solution to envi-
ronmental problems requires the proportion sharing of burdens while pro-
viding incentives to internalize costs. If powerful nations decide for
themselves the proper balance of burdens, then we will have a power-based
trade regime characterized by disguised self-interest, rather than a legal or
ethical regime that will command the allegiance and respect of all nations.
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